Living Below The Security Poverty Line:


Coping Mechanisms

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Session ID: SECT-F41

Session Classification:

Intermediate









SPL: Outside View



Security Poverty Line

Organizations that don't have enough resources to implement perceived basic security needs.

Security Subsistence Syndrome

"I can't even do the barest minimum to cover my ass, so I'd better not do anything **but** cover my ass."

Accruing Technical Debt


With every step forward, the undone work increases risk and makes future steps harder.

This is a dangerous way to operate!





How much is "good enough"?







How much is "good enough"?







SPL: Inside View



Below the Security Poverty Line ...

- Little to no IT expertise
- Can't follow through on long-term recommendations of consultant
- Can't update security software installations
- Can't tune SIEM or IPS
- Maintenance takes back seat to outages and new installs





Below the Security Poverty Line ...

- Disproportionately dependent on third party vendors
 - Limited span of control
 - Configuration and tuning decisions
 - Architecture and strategy decisions

Risk management

Information asymmetry







Technical debt below the SPL ...

- Default settings
- Workarounds (such as remote access programs)
- Lots of sharing (vendors, servers, code, data, other resources)
- Limited span of control
- Limited span of attention
- "We'll fix that later"
- No logs





Why defer risk?



What your organization thinks it can get away with





The business defers risk

"Let's wait until we actually get attacked." CIO to law enforcement officer, in a briefing about threat activity





... so we enter CYA mode.



Business Owner

Here is my project. Is it safe?

That's really long. Can you fill it out for me?

Really? Is that a showstopper?

Security

Here's our ISO 27002 checklist of every mistake anyone's ever made. Prove you haven't.



Sure. You have a bunch of esoteric risk here.

If I say yes, you're going to override me, aren't you?

And if I say no, I'm in trouble if this goes wrong...






Self-improvement



Measuring a security program

INSERT SLIDE TITLE HERE



Goal of any security program: dv/dt > 0

Below the Security Poverty Line, we see Security Subsistence Syndrome: relying on *resources*, not *capabilities*.

Goal: dr/dt > 0

A *good* security program wants to create surplus.

Goal: dc/dt > 0





Budget issues

- Budgets are low to nonexistent, or come from a different "bucket"
- Security budget can be ephemeral and last-minute
- No discretionary spending even at beginning of fiscal year



Do you know what \$2,000 will buy?



What \$2,000 will buy

What	Details	How much
Endpoint protection suite for 25 seats, plus 2 yrs maintenance	AV, email/web filtering, desktop firewall, device control	\$1,980
Web application scanning for 1 website	Permanent license (no upgrades)	\$1,445
Web application scanning for 20 months, 10 sites	100 pages max/site, only 3 types of vulnerabilities checked	\$2,000
Hosted email security, 85 users	1 year subscription	\$2,000
Penetration testing suite that runs on a phone (qty 2)	8+ testing tools, includes wireless card	\$1,920





-What \$2,000 will <u>not</u> buy

What	Details	How much
Software-based IPS	50 Mbps throughput	\$2,500
File integrity monitoring	Server (no agents)	\$3,999
Market leader application security testing service	1 year's subscription for 1 application	\$3,000 - \$7,500
SIEM for managing log collector	For 1 server, connects to 1 log appliance	\$13,800*
Anti-DDoS appliance	2 Gbps throughput	\$70,000





Stop Juggling!





Engage the business



Business Owner

Here is my project. Is it safe?

Wait, what?

Ummm....

Here's my assessment of my risk. I think this is reasonably safe.

Security

I don't know. Is it?



Here's how to think about safety. Do you think your product is safe?

Great, glad to hear it. Can you fix those outliers in your next release?







Questions? Answers? Pontifications?

